

Validity of Perception in Ramanuja's Philosophy

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Introduction

In Bhagavad Rāmānujācārya's philosophy [Viśiṣṭādvaita], Srīman Nārāyaṇa alone having cit (the sentient) and acit (the non-sentient) for His qualifications is the sole Reality, one without a second. He alone, propitiated by devotion and self-surrender, is the means (to salvation) and He alone qualified by the non-material reality is the goal to be attained.

(Śrī is Lakṣmī. Śrī and Nārāyaṇa are inseparably united; this dual form of the Godhead constitutes the highest Brahman, the Father-Mother principle of the universe. The mutual relation of Śrī and Nārāyaṇa, in the language of the Pāñcarātras, is one of avinābhāva like that of dharma and dharmin, ahaṁtā and ahaṁ, light and luminosity, sun and sunshine, etc. Though they are regarded as distinct, there is no difference in their functions or tastes. The so-called dualism is kept up for cosmic functions and redemption of the jīvas. As Śrīvatsāṅkamiśra puts it in his Śrīstava, even Bhagavān is guided by Śrī in His cosmic functions as well as redemptive acts. If Nārāyaṇa represents the principle of justice, as the Father of the universe, Lakṣmī, as the Mother of all, is the embodiment of dayā or kṛpā. She mediates on behalf of the bound jīva and bestows upon him salvation.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, liberation is not identity with Brahman. When the mukta gives up his physical body, he reaches Vaikuntha, the spiritual realm made of bliss itself. In this noumenal realm, he is lost in the bliss of Brahman, experiencing sālokya, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya).

Preamble - Reality Classification

All knowable things are divided into two kinds, as pramāṇa (the means of valid knowledge) and prameya (object of valid knowledge).

The means of valid knowledge is only threefold. (The Cārvākas accept only one pramāṇa, viz., perception: the Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas accept two pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference: the Sāṅkhyas accept three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony: the Naiyāyikas accept four, viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony: the Prābhākaras accept five, viz., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and postulation: the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins accept six, viz., the five above pramāṇas and non-cognition: the Paurāṇikas accept eight pramāṇas, viz., the above six pramāṇas and sambhava and aitiḥya: the Viśiṣṭādvaitins like the Sāṅkhyas accept only three pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony. It can be shown why smṛiti, pratyabhijñā, anupalabdhi, ūha and samśaya are brought under pratyakṣa, and upamāna and arthāpatti under anumāna.)

The object of valid knowledge is twofold, because of the difference as dravya (substance) and adravya (non-substance). Dravya is of two kinds, as jaḍa (material) and ajaḍa (immaterial). Jaḍa is of two kinds, as prakṛti (primordial matter) and time. Prakṛti is of the nature of twenty-four categories. (According to Vedānta cosmology, the acit differentiates itself into the successive forms of the twenty-four categories of prakṛti, mahat, ahankāra, the eleven indriyas, the five tanmātras and the five bhūtas. Thus, the evolutionary process of sadvidyā teaches the non-difference between Brahman and the universe). Time is of three kinds owing to limitation. (Past, present and future.)

The ajaḍa is of two kinds, as parāk (the external) and pratyak (the internal). The parāk which is ajaḍa, is, in its turn, of two kinds, as nityavibhūti (the eternal manifestation) and dharmabhūtajñāna (the

attributive consciousness). The pratyak is also of two kinds, because of the difference as jīva (the individual self) and īśvara.

Sources of Knowledge

Of these, the instrument of valid knowledge is pramāṇa. What is defined lakṣya) is pramāṇa. The definition is that it (pramāṇa) has the quality of causing pramā (valid knowledge). Pramā is that knowledge which is adapted to practical utility of life as they really are. (It is difficult to bring out the full import of the word 'vyavahāra'. It is not mere conduct or behaviour. Vyavahāra stands for the test of practical needs of life in their proper perspective. Prof. M. Hiriyanna has translated vyavahārānugūṇa as 'adapted to practical interests of life'. Knowledge is true not only when it agrees with outside reality, but also when it satisfies the practical interests of life. Truth is that which is both experientially and experimentally verified).

If it be said 'Pramā is knowledge', there would be over-pervasion in the (erroneous) cognition of a nacre in the form, 'this is silver'; hence it is said 'adapted to practical interests of life'. Even then there would be over-pervasion as one may have the perception (of a nacre) in the form, 'this is silver' in a state of delusion; hence it is said as they really are'. By the expression as they really are', saṃśaya (doubt), anyathājñāna (wrong knowledge) and viparītajñāna (contrary knowledge) are excluded.

Samśaya is the recollection of several mutually contradictory attributes when a thing is apprehended; for instance, the (dubitative) cognition in respect of a tall object, 'Is this a stump or man?'. What is called anyathājñāna is the misapprehension of one attribute for another; for instance, the predication made by sophistic arguments, that the agency (of the individual self) is a delusion; whereas the individual self shines as an agent. What is called viparītajñāna is the misapprehension of one thing for another; for instance, the cognition of another object in the place of the intended object. (To cognize a nacre as a piece of silver.)

A definition could have three defects: avyāpti (under-reach), ativyāpti (over-reach) and asambhava (absolute inapplicability). Avyāpti is the absence of the definition in a thing sought to be defined; for instance, in the definition, the characteristic of the cow is the possession of orange-brown colour, there is non-pervasion in respect of (the cows) possessing white colour. Ativyāpti is the presence of the definition in something else other than the things sought to be defined. (E.g., the definition 'that is a cow which possesses horns' applies to buffaloes also which are not intended to be defined). Asambhava is the absence of definition anywhere in the thing defined. The statement, 'the self is an object of ocular perception' is an example of total inapplicability. Therefore, the definition of pramā is established, because of the absence of the above-said three defects.

The instrument (karana) is that which is the best cause (for the production of pramā). (Previously it was stated that instrument (karaṇa) of valid knowledge is pramāṇa. Here the meaning of karaṇa is explained). The best cause is that which is most important. It is said that (instrument) is 'most important' by which knowledge arises without delay. Hence it is established pramāṇa is the cause of valid knowledge. The definition of pramāṇa as one which makes known what is not already known and the like are unacceptable in as much as they have been refuted by their own propounders. (A section of the Advaitins themselves do not accept the view of valid knowledge as consisting in having for its content a thing that is not already known (anadhigata).

PRATYAKṢA (Perception)

These pramāṇas are three - pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), and śabda (verbal testimony).

Of these, *pratyakṣa* is that which is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge. 'Perceptual' is used to differentiate it from inference. 'Valid knowledge' is used to differentiate it from the (erroneous) knowledge arising from the defective sense organ. (If wrong knowledge is generated owing to defective sense organ, it cannot be defined as 'that knowledge which is adapted to practical interests of life as they really are'. And consequently, owing to the absence of proper instrument of *pramā*, the evidence becomes invalid).

And this perception is twofold, because of the difference as *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). What is called *nirvikalpaka* is the cognition of the first individual (object) qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. The *savikalpaka* is the cognition of the subsequent (second, third and so on) individuals qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. grasped with retrospection. (What was indefinite and devoid of specific judgement in the *nirvikalpaka* perception becomes definite and determinate in the *savikalpaka* perception. In Advaita epistemology, the *savikalpaka* apprehends relatedness whereas the *nirvikalpaka* does not apprehend any relation (*samsarga*). If the latter is absolutely non-relational, there arises some difficulty in determining its perceptibility. Hence in Viśiṣṭādvaita the *nirvikalpaka* is called '*prathamapiṇḍagrahana*' or the cognition of the individual for the first time, in which the generic character of the object alone is apprehended. The second is called '*dvitiyapiṇḍagrahaṇa*' or the cognition of the individual for the second time, in which what was already known becomes explicit. It may be noted that both perceptions are *saviśeṣa* - not *nirviśeṣa*). In both cases, this (perception) has for its object, only what is qualified (by attributes etc.). Since it is not possible to possess knowledge which apprehends unqualified (objects), (the perception of non-differenced objects) is inadmissible.

The mode of perception is thus: The individual self is joined with the mind (*manas*), mind with the sense organ, and the sense organ with the object of knowledge; since, as a rule, the sense organs do their function by coming into contact with the object to be cognized. Therefore, when the visual sense is in contact with an object, in the form of *jar* etc., ocular knowledge arises in the form 'this is *jar*'. Thus, also are the tactual and other perceptions.

Conjunction (*sanyoga*) is the sense-relation when a substance is perceived. When the colour of a substance is perceived, the sense-relation is dependence in what is conjoined (with the sense organ), (A substance comes into contact with visual sense faculty, along with its colour, which is connected with the *jar* through the relation of *āśrayaṇa*'. This sense-relation which causes perceptual knowledge is known in Viśiṣṭādvaita as '*samyuktāśrayanasambandha*'), since we do not admit (the relation of) inherence'. (According to Naiyāyikas, '*samavāya*' or inherence is one of the causes that brings about perceptive cognition).

Nirvikalpaka and *savikalpaka* perceptions are twofold, as the *arvācīna* (recent) and *anarvācīna* (the ancient). The *arvacina* is again twofold, as the dependent of sense and the independent of sense. The independent of sense is twofold, as the self-accomplished and the divine. The self-accomplished is the result of yoga. The divine (perception) is what is engendered by the grace of Bhagavān. The *anarvācīna* does not require the aid of the senses; it is the knowledge of the liberated (selves), the eternal and *Isvara*. The *anarvācīna* has been referred to owing to the context. Thus, it is established that *pratyakṣa* is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge.

Discussion – Types of perception

Recollection - Now, *pramā* was defined as that knowledge which is adapted to practical interests of life as they really are. But likewise, the recollection (*smṛti*) also has the quality of being adapted to experience as it really is; since recollection also may be considered as a *pramāṇa*, how was it stated

that the *pramāṇas* are three only? To this, we reply: Even if recollection is admitted as *pramāṇa*, it has to depend on reminiscent impressions (*samskāra*); since perception is the origin of reminiscent impressions, it (recollection) is brought under perception which is the original cause, (Here, Viśiṣṭādvaita follows the Nyāya theory of *smṛti*. According to Annambhatta, *smṛti* is the knowledge which is caused only by the *samskāra*. A *samskāra* is nothing but a reminiscent impression derived from a prior experience. When such an 'impression' dependent on a prior experience becomes the cause of memory, it cannot claim to be a separate way of knowing.) and so there is no need to regard it as a separate *pramāṇa*. Therefore, the *pramāṇas* are three only.

What is called recollection is the knowledge derived only from the reminiscent impressions caused by a prior experience. And what recalls the reminiscent impression is as follows: "Those that rouse the seed of recollection are *sadrśya* (similarity), *adrśta* (unseen effect of previous karma), *cintā* (deep thinking), etc. In accordance with what has been said (above), the (recaller) is sometimes the similar-sight (of an object previously seen); sometimes an unseen effect (of one's actions); sometimes deep thinking. Since from the term 'ādi' (etcetera), association' (or concomitance) is to be understood, even that becomes (the cause of recollection).

What is caused by similarity is thus: If Devadatta and Yajñadatta resemble each other, the sight of Devadatta kindles the recollection of Yajñadatta. The second: like the spontaneous remembrance of a prior experience, such as the sacred place of Srirangam etc. (The famous shrine of Sri Ranganātha is situated in Srirangam). The third: like the recollection of the lovely, divine, and auspicious figure of Śrī Venkatesa while (consciously) thinking. The fourth is thus: between Devadatta and Yajñadatta who are seen in association, the sight of one kindles the recollection of the other.

The principle is that whatever is well experienced before, becomes the object of recollection. The absence of recollection is caused either by long duration of time (after experience) or by disease etc. which obscure the reminiscent impressions.

Re-cognition - Just as recollection is included in *pratyakṣa*, recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) also in the form of 'this is that Devadatta' is included in perception. (According to Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins, *pratyabhijñā* is a cognitive complex consisting of *pratyakṣa* and *smṛti*. But the Naiyāyikas would account for it by including in *pratyakṣa* of a particular type, without recognizing any such parts. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin, to keep up consistency, would have to bring *pratyabhijñā* under *pratyakṣa*, as *smṛti* itself is included in *pratyakṣa*. For *pratyabhijñā* is nothing but perceptual experience arising through the contact of the sense organ with some object). In our system, since non-existence is nothing but another form of existence, (This is a vexed question among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Advaitins along with the Bhāṭṭas accept *abhāva* as the sixth *pramāṇa*. The Naiyāyikas do not admit it as a distinct *pramāṇa*, though they hold it as a distinct category. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins along with the Prābhākaras refute the theory that *abhāva* is a distinct category, and equate it with the 'mere floor' (or *kevalādhikarana*) in the absence of a jar on the floor.), the knowledge of non-existence is also included in *pratyakṣa*. (For instance), on this floor, the absolute non-existence of the jar is the floor itself. The antecedent non-existence of the jar is clay itself. The destruction of the jar means potsherds.

Conjecture (*Uha*) is such as this: Indeed this must be a person'. It has been said that doubt is the non-determinative cognition of the form, 'What is this tree in front of me?'. These (conjecture and doubt) are also included in *pratyakṣa*. Special mental powers (*pratibhā*) of holy personages are also included in *pratyakṣa*.

Doctrine - Since it has been said that according to the knowers of Vedānta all knowledge is of the real, the perceptual knowledge in the form of error etc. is of the real. (Cf. Śrībhāṣya (1, 1, 1): "Those who

understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real; for śruti and smṛti alike teach that everything' participates in the essential nature of everything else'. In the scriptural account of evolution, it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite. For instance, the red colour in fire comes from the primal fire, white colour from water and the black colour from earth. In the same way, all things are composed of elements of all things. The Vedānta theory of pañcīkaraṇa says that all things are composed of all the five elements in varying degrees. But the thing-hood of every object is largely shaped by the preponderant element. We find some similarity between nacre and silver owing to intermixture of common component parts. In the nacre-silver illusion, owing to ocular defect, the percipient picks up a nacre mistaking it for silver though the silver-content is insignificant. When the percipient's vision is free from any defect, he apprehends the nacre-content, and there is no illusion for him. Hence the cognition of silver in nacre is true though the silver-content has no economic value. Likewise, when one cognition is being sublated by another, the disillusionment is explained on the basis of preponderant element in its constitution. So, whenever we apprehend the preponderant element of an object, the cognition becomes more true, the fragmentary perception becomes less true. There is no illusion in the Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology in its literal sense.).

About theory of Error or mistake

Rejecting the theories of *akhyāti* (non-apprehension), *ātmakhyāti* (self-apprehension), *anirvacanīyākhyāti* (indefinable apprehension), *anyathākhyāti* (misapprehension) and *asatkhyāti* (non-being's apprehension), the theory of ***satkhyāti*** (reality-apprehension) is accepted.

(There are five theories of illusion: *ātmakhyāti*, *asatkhyāti*, *akhyāti*, *anyathākhyāti* and *anirvacanīyākhyāti*. These theories of bhrama are accepted by *Yogācāras*, *Madhyamikas*, *Prābhākaras*, *Naiyāyikas* and *Advaitins* respectively.

The Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, otherwise known as the Yogācāra school, explains bhrama as subsisting in the 'ātman' (consciousness) which externalizes itself in the form of objects like silver in the silver-nacre illusion. This theory of error is called *Ātmakhyāti*. Viśiṣṭādvaita refutes the theory of *ātmakhyāti* in which, cognition arising without a corresponding object produces silver and makes it its object; for this *khyāti* fails to explain not only the production of the effect, but also contradicts an admitted principle according to which there are four causes that bring out a cognition: they are the adhipati-cause, the saḥakāri-cause, the ālambana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. According to Yogācāras, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanency. According to this principle, it is difficult to prove that the form of subsequent cognition is due to the action of the previous cognition independent of external object. For, it cannot be maintained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of red colour, there arises immediately the cognition of another colour. Therefore, the conclusion is that the manifoldness of cognitions is due only to the manifoldness of objects.

The Sūnyavādins explain bhrama as consisting in the cognition of *asat* (non-being). In the case of a wrong cognition this is silver, which arises in the absence of silver, the object of cognition is 'asat'. Due to such experience, even *asat* becomes competent as an object of cognition. This theory of error is known as *asatkhyāti*.

Viśiṣṭādvaita strongly repudiates the theory of the Mādhyamikas who state that there is nothing save a universal void. If it is stated that 'Nothing is the only Reality', the Vedāntasūtrā replies, 'And on account of its being unproved in every way' (2.2.30). If these nihilists are asked whether they hold that everything is existence, or non-existence, or anything else, they cannot establish nothingness on any of these views; for, the ideas of existence and non-existence have reference only to specific states of really existing things. Hence any theory of nothingness would imply the acceptance of the reality of

things. Moreover, if one wants to establish the doctrine of śūnya, he must attempt it only with the help of some means of knowledge, the reality of which he must admit. On the contrary, if he does not acknowledge the validity of the means of knowledge, everything becomes real. The conclusion is that *asat* cannot be established in any way.

The Prābhākaras accept the reality of two cognitions, the perceived nacre as 'this' (*idam*) and the recollection of silver seen elsewhere. At the time of cognition, the percipient is unable to identify the recollection of silver as recollection since he merely apprehends it as cognition. The object of recollection, silver, enters his consciousness, divested of its association with a particular place or time. In other words, when two cognitions of silver and nacre arise, the percipient misses their difference owing to his non-discrimination consequent on the visual defect. So there arises *pravṛtti* (volition) on his part to pick up the so-called silver. When he finds that there is no silver at all, the disillusionment comes with the conviction that his activity was in vain. Even this theory is imperfect as it cannot adequately account for the mental decision on the part of the percipient to pick up silver when there is no silver at all. Nor is mere non-discrimination between the recollection of silver and the present perception sufficient to induce *pravṛtti* leading to activity.

The Nyāya theory of *bhrama* is known as *anyahākhyāti*. According to this *khyāti* when one thing, nacre, is wrongly perceived as silver the erroneous cognition takes the form 'this is silver'. Here 'this' stands for nacre which is not perceived as nacre owing to some ocular defect. This visual perception of nacre as "this" arises in the usual way by the contact of the sense with the object. Only the silverness which is the property of some silver existing elsewhere is presented to the perception as belonging to nacre as 'this'. But how could there be a perception of silver when there is no sense-relation between the silver and the sense of sight? So, to get over this difficulty the Naiyāyikas hold that the real silver is connected with the sense of sight through a super-normal type of sense-relation (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*). Though the Naiyāyika contends that *sat* alone is being presented to the consciousness, he confounds the theory by trying to bring an absent reality within the range of the sense through supernormal relation; otherwise he cannot explain how *bhrama* consists in wrongly perceiving the nacre as silver which is elsewhere.

The Advaita theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* holds that *bhrama* is neither real nor unreal, nor both, and is therefore inexplicable. According to Advaita (vide *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*) the silver-nacre illusion takes place in the following manner: When the defective sight of a person comes in contact with an object (nacre), a *vṛtti* of the internal-organ which has the form of 'this' and the form of brightness arises; and in that *vṛtti*, *Caitanya* limited by this is reflected. Then owing to out-going *vṛtti*, the *Caitanya* limited by 'this', the *Caitanya* limited by the *vṛtti* and cognizer-consciousness become one. Then *avidyā*, which is present in *viśayacaitanya* identical with *pramātracaitanya*, which has nacreness for its mode, and helped by the *saṁskāra* of silver, kindled up by the similarity between the object seen as 'this' and silver, transforms itself into an object with the appearance of silver and into an apparent cognition of silver. In this state of false superimposition, the experience is real as long as the cognition lasts, and then becomes unreal when true knowledge dawns.

Of all the theories of *bhrama*, none has been subjected by Sri Rāmānuja to such a thorough examination as the theory of *avidyā*. This classical refutation is known as '**saptavidha-anupapatti**', viz., *āśrayānupatti*, *tirodhānānupapatti*, *svarūpānupapatti*, *anirvacanīyatvānupapatti*, *pramāṇānupapatti*, *nivartakānupapatti* and *nivṛtṭyanupapatti*. In explaining the *anirvacanīyatvānupapatti*, it is asked: what is meant by the *anirvacanīyatā* of *avidyā*. If *anirvacanīyatva* is defined as the difference of *avidyā* from *sat* and *asat*, it would be actually inexplicable, since no means of knowledge can enable us to understand it. In our experience we find that the whole host of objects is arranged according to our states of consciousness (*pratīti*), and each state of consciousness presents itself in the form of *sat* or

asat. If, therefore, we should assume that of states of consciousness, which are in the form of *sat* or *asat*, the object is neither *sat* nor *asat*, then anything might be the object of any state of consciousness.).

What is called *satkhyāti* (the theory of reality-apprehension) is the reality of the object of consciousness. To the query what then is *bhrama* (error), (we reply) that *bhrama* consists in invalidating the utility of an object. (A piece of nacre cannot serve the purpose of silver.).

Methodology to explain illusion

Mistaking Oyster-shell as Silver - We shall thus explain it; By the process of quintuplication, all the elements are present in all (the elements) like earth etc. Therefore, owing to the presence of a small portion of silver in the nacre, the object of that consciousness (i.e., silver) is true. But there, as the portion of silver-content is infinitesimal, it cannot serve the purpose of practical life; hence that cognition is *bhrama* (The knowledge of silver in nacre). The *bhrama* disappears, because of the knowledge of the preponderance of the nacre-content (in the object).

The cognition of dream etc. is also real. From the *śruti*, we understand that the Supreme Person creates chariots etc., ("There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then He creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss; then He creates delights, joys and bliss. There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then He creates tanks, lakes and rivers. For he is the Maker' (Br. Up., 4, 3, 10)) subsisting for a certain time only (When the dreaming person wakes up, all the dream perceptions vanish.), for the experience of that particular individual self (Only the dreaming person perceives chariots etc., and not others.) (in accordance with its spiritual merit and demerit).

In the case of (the cognition), 'the conch is yellow', (the explanation is as follows): The visual rays of the eye which are in contact with the bile of the eye (The eyes become yellow owing to certain diseases like jaundice. This is called '*pitta*' supposed to be caused by excess of bile.) establish conjunction with the conch; then the whiteness belonging to the conch is overpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not cognized. Therefore, arises the cognition, 'the conch is yellow', like a gold-gilt conch. The yellowness issuing from his eye, owing to his extreme subtlety, is apprehended by him alone and not by others.

(Likewise) the crystal which is placed near a China-rose is cognized as red. (For, the colour of the crystal is overpowered by the brilliant red of the China-rose). The cognition of that also is real.

In the aforesaid manner, the cognition of water in the mirage also is true (Water always exists in conjunction with light and earth; but owing to the ocular defect of the percipient and the *adr̥ṣṭa*, the light and earth are not cognized, while the water is alone cognized.), owing to the quintuplication of elements. The process of *pañcīkaraṇa* is described elsewhere.

In the same way, the case of one direction being mistaken for another is true; since one direction which (really) exists in another direction is cognized (As a matter of fact, the direction is one. By a sort of artificial division, the direction is divided into east, west, south, north, etc. A village which is to the east of one is to the west of another.) and apart from the limiting adjuncts (which divide the directions) no (distinct) substance as direction (*dik*) is admitted (in our system). (According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* realists, *dik* is a distinct substance. It can be stated that *dik* need not be admitted as a distinct category inasmuch as it is derivable from the connection of the apparent motion of the sun with the sky.).

In the case of the firebrand swung round rapidly, owing to the non-apprehension of the intervals (This is analogous to the cognition of a real wheel; but in the case of a real wheel, no intervals are cognized as there are none, while in the case of a firebrand, none are cognized owing to the rapidity of the

movement.) by virtue of the rapidity of the movement, that object itself which is in conjunction with (all) points of the space (i.e. circle) is cognized in the form of a (fiery) wheel. This cognition is also real.

The cognition of one's own face in mirrors etc. (Similar reflecting surfaces) is likewise true. (What happens is) that when the motion of the visual rays (issuing from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed by the mirror, those rays cognize the person's own face after the perception of the mirror; and even in this case, owing to the non-apprehension of any interval (between the mirror perception and face-perception) by virtue of the rapidity (of the process), the face is perceived as if in the mirror.

In the case of the apprehension of a double moon (what happens is this): Owing to pressure of the finger on the eye, or by some disease of the eye called *timira* etc., the visual rays are divided; (and consequently), there originates difference in the apparatus of the vision (*sāmagri*); (then) the mutually independent double apparatus of the vision becomes the cause for the cognition of the double moon. (One *sāmagri* cognizes the moon in her real place. The other *sāmagri* moving somewhat obliquely cognizes at first a spot near the moon, and then the moon herself who appears a little removed from her original position. Although there is only one moon qualified by connection with two spots simultaneously, the affection of the eye gives rise to difference in the *sāmagri*, which in turn to a double apprehension, and the latter again to the doubleness of the moon.) The doubling of the apparatus of vision being true, by it the double apprehension of the moon takes place.

Established View

Hence all apprehensions are likewise true, having for their contents objects affected with difference, because a non-differenced object is never apprehended. (It is not possible to apprehend any object devoid of all difference; for instance, a cow devoid of attributes and configuration. It has been already stated that even the non-determinate perception apprehends only objects marked with difference.).

Then, perception which is of the aforesaid nature, at first apprehends difference alone. Difference in its experience (or expression) as such requires a counter-entity, but never in its essential nature. (All states of consciousness have for their object something that is qualified by difference as appears in the case of judgement like 'this is a jar'. When a jar is apprehended, it is so apprehended as different from all other objects such as book, table, etc. Difference there means nothing but jariness. But in the perception 'this is a jar', it is comprehended not as difference but as jariness alone. When it is to be comprehended as difference, it requires a counter-entity; and so comprehended it is responsible for the saying 'jar is different from cloth'.). Hence the faults of *regressus in infinitum* and logical seesaw are absent. (Viśiṣṭādvaitā does not admit these two faults; for the only objects of perception are those that are qualified by generic character etc., which, as relative things, give rise to the judgement revealing the difference between themselves and the things in which they inhere. Moreover, as soon as a perceptive cognition takes place, we at once apprehend on the one hand, the generic character which is the basis of difference from everything else, and on the other, the essential nature of the thing itself. Just as consciousness manifests itself as well as the object known, the difference also reveals itself as well as the things which differ.). *Regressus in infinitum* is begging the question. Logical seesaw is mutual dependence.

Now, why should not the apprehension derived from "Thou art the tenth" be treated as perception?' (Ten persons crossed a river. One amongst them, desiring to know whether all of them had reached the other shore safely, counted all from one to nine except himself. All of them were in a great fix as the tenth person could not be traced. A Nestor came to their rescue and counted them all from one to nine and declared the tenth person as 'thou art the tenth'.). For this, the reply is no; for, though 'thou' is a perceptual cognition, the 'tenth I am' is sentence-generated cognition. If it be insisted that

'Thou art the tenth' must be treated as an object of perceptual cognition, then (by the same logic) 'Thou art meritorious' also must come under perception. (Dharma is not an object of perceptive cognition.). If that be admitted, then it will be an extra-ordinary stretch of a rule! Hence knowledge generated from such a sentence as 'Thou art That is not immediate.

By what has been said, the (following) distorted views are hereby refuted: (This is the Advaita theory of perceptual cognition.) "Pramāṇa is that which is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge; (that) valid knowledge is but consciousness. Consciousness is of three kinds: consciousness limited by the internal organ, consciousness limited by the activity (vṛtti) of the internal organ, and consciousness limited by the content. When all the three kinds of consciousness become one, then there is immediate apprehension; and that (sākṣatkāra) has for its object that which is devoid of any difference; it comprehends nondifference only.

The Naiyayika view (Tatra niṣprakāraṇam jñānam nirvikalpakam. (Tarkasāgraha). that the non-determinate cognition is the apprehension of the mere object divested of all (qualifications) such as genus etc. is also refuted.

On the status of Nyāya as Vidyāsthāna

Now, how is the school of Gautama (Akṣapāda Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtras.) refuted? For, it has been said that the schools of Kānāda (Otherwise known as Ulūka and Kāśyapa, the composer of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras.) and Pāṇini (The celebrated Sanskrit grammarian who is said to have obtained his knowledge of grammar from Lord Siva himself.) are helpful (to the understanding of) every branch of knowledge. For this, the reply is: that school is not refuted by us *in toto*. Whatever is amenable to reason that is accepted by us, like the subsistence derived from the tank built by others, but not the mire in it.

Hence, there is no contradiction in our rejecting the (following) views which are against the opinion of the Sūtrakāra and others: the causation (of the universe) by atoms; the personal origin of the Vedas (If Indra and other gods are corporeal, they must be non-eternal also. Consequently, the Vedic words denoting the vedic deities also become non-eternal. Secondly, from the Scripture we understand that many mantras have 'makers'; for instance, 'Reverence to the ṛṣis who are the makers of the mantras', 'That is Agni; this is a hymn of Viśvāmitra', etc. From all this it may be assumed that the Vedas have personal origin only. This view is refuted by Viśiṣṭādvaita. For, Vedic words such as Indra and others, unlike the word Devadatta which denotes a particular individual, denote by their own power particular species of beings, like the word 'cow' which denotes particular species of animals.

Therefore, when an individual belonging to Indra-class has perished, - the Creator, on the basis of the Vedic word 'Indra' which is being presented to his mind creates another Indra possessing the same attributes. Hence Vedas cannot be non-eternal owing to corporeality of the gods.

Now, regarding the authorship of the Vedas; the creation of Vasiṣṭha and other ṛṣis, who denote classes is preceded by their being presented to Prajāpati's mind through those words; then He creates them endowed with the very same characteristics and appoints them to see the very same 'kāṇḍas' and 'mantras'. These ṛṣis, being endowed thus, undergo the proper discipline and finally 'see' the mantras in their very sounds and accents, declared by the Vasiṣṭhas and other ṛṣis of former aeons. The Vedic mantras have a personal origin only in such a relative sense.); proving (the existence of) Isvara by inference (The Infinite Being beyond all contact with the sense is not an object of perception or inference. In the first place, perception being based either on the sense organs or on yogic powers is incapable of apprehending that which transcends all relations. Nor does Brahman fall within the sphere of inference either of the kind which proceeds from the viśeṣa or of the kind based on sāmānya.

The former one is inadmissible, for such inference is not related to anything beyond the range of the senses. Nor is it of the latter kind, since we do not see any *linga* that is invariably connected with a Supreme Self who is capable of creating the universe. A persistent ratiocination still cannot show us a way to infer the Supreme Self. The teleological and cosmological arguments cannot prove Him as the world-architect or the first cause that exists *per se*. There is no proof to show that the earth, mountains and oceans though created, were emanated from one Creator. Nor could it be proved that all the effected things have a homogeneous character like a jar, because we see many effects are qualified by the difference of time of production etc. Nor by inference can any one maintain that the highest Self with infinite power alone can create; for even individual beings by means of extraordinary power acquired by religious merit can create. Hence Scripture is the only means for knowing Brahman, the highest Reality.); the pervasiveness of the individual self (According to Viśiṣṭādvaita the *jīva* is atomic in size.); acceptance of generality, inherence and particularity as categories (these categories are refuted.); to regard 'comparison' as a separate *pramāṇa* (subsumed under *Anumāna*); to consider number, size, separateness, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, etc. as separate attributes (these are *adravya*); to regard 'direction' as a separate substance etc.

Conclusion

While some systems of philosophy aver that the visible world is an illusion, likening it to dream-like [non-factual] experience, Bhagavad Rāmānujācārya holds all experiences including those during dreams as true and authentic, in the line of Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa, truly following his Brahma-Sūtra-s. स्वप्नसत्यं जगत् इत्यस्य कैश्चित् - यथा स्वप्नस्य असत्यत्वं, तथा परिदृश्यमान-जाग्रदवस्थजगतोऽपि मिथ्यात्वम् इति विवृते सति, भगवद्रामानुजाचार्यैः स्वप्नः यथा सत्यः तत्रानुभूयमानाश्च पदार्थाः सत्याः चेतनकर्मफलानुभवरूपाः, क्वचित् आगामिशुभाशुभरूपफलसूचकाश्चेति शारीरके वेदवित्सिद्धान्तत्वेन स्थापितः, छान्दोग्यश्रुतेः, श्रीमद्रामायणे भरतस्वप्न, त्रिजटास्वप्नयोः च अस्मिन्नंशे दृष्टान्तत्वात्, तथैव जगतोऽपि सत्यत्वमिति प्रमाणयुक्तिभिः सुदृढं स्थापयन्ति ।

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